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After the bursting of the housing-price bubble in 2006 and ensuing financial crisis, there has been much 
discussion of what economists could have done differently to help avert the crisis and „Great 
Recession‟ that followed. One dimension of this concerns information supplied by economists to the 
general public about causes of high appreciation in home prices and their likely future course, as good 
information could have helped the public hedge their finances against downside risks while bad 
information may have encouraged them to take on too much risk. This paper analyzes data from 24 
California newspapers on assessments and predictions offered by economists as to whether bubbles 
were forming in the state‟s housing markets. In brief, we find that the California public was fairly 
decently served by economists offering their views via the media -- although with some significant 
problems of biased forecasts not made in good faith, and of inattention to concerns about „harm 
avoidance‟ that ought to apply when economists share their opinions in this way.  
__________________________ 
*  Please address correspondence to: Martha A. Starr, Department of Economics, American University, 
4400 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20016-8029. Phone: 202-885-3747. Email: 
mstarr@american.edu. I am grateful to Jessica Carrick-Hagenbarth, Firat Demir, Gerald Epstein, 
George DeMartino, David George, and Will Millberg for valuable comments on an earlier version of the 
paper.  
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Introduction 
The role of economists in causing or failing to avert the 2008 financial crisis and ensuing Great 
Recession has been much discussed in the economic profession. To date, debate has centered on 
questions of whether top economic policymakers could or should have recognized the rising systemic 
financial risks associated with the housing-price bubble and the lending boom which accompanied it, 
and whether they should have made changes in policies that could have contained these risks.
1 Also 
much questioned is whether widely-used theoretical frameworks, like the „dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium approach‟ to macroeconomic modeling or the efficient-markets view of financial markets, 
inadequately capture risks of instabilities in highly financialized economies, causing policymakers to 
miss accumulating risks (Buiter 2009, Krugman 2009, Colander et al. 2009, Gordon 2009, White 2009).   
Less attention has been paid to information and analysis supplied by economists to the general public 
in the years when the housing bubble was building. As documented by Blinder and Krueger (2004), the 
public‟s main source of economic information is the media, with television and newspapers at the top 
of the list.
2 During the years before 2006, when home prices were strongly increasing in many parts of 
the U.S., economists‟ opinions as to the causes and consequences of these increases were regularly 
solicited and reported in the press. Had a preponderance of economists expressed concerns that strong 
increases in home prices were likely to peter out and/or that price levels could even fall, people living 
in areas where prices were soaring might have been better able to form unbiased expectations of 
future home prices. At best, tamping down the public‟s expectations of future appreciation may have 
helped reduce upward pressure on home prices, so that markets could have settled down before 
bubbles fully inflated. At least, it may have enabled more households to hedge their finances against 
possibilities of flat or falling prices.  
To be sure, the views of prominent economists who recognized early on that housing prices were 
diverging from fundamentals in many metropolitan areas, like Dean Baker and Robert Shiller, were 
widely covered in the popular press in 2002-05, as the housing-price bubble was inflating. Thus, for 
example, USA Today covered Baker‟s views six times during this period and those of Shiller thrice; 
Shiller appeared on the evening news of all three major broadcast networks; and Newsweek ran three 
articles mentioning Shiller‟s views that home prices were irrationally high. Yet similar coverage was 
given to the views of Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, who maintained until 2005 that widespread 
housing bubbles were „really quite unlikely‟ and his successor Ben Bernanke, who argued as late as 
                                                           
1 See, for example, Taylor (2007); Baker (2008); Kregel (2008); Crotty (2009); Dokko et al. (2009); 
Calza, Monacelli and Stracca (2009); the collection of papers in the June 2009 special issue of Critical 
Review; Duca, Muellbauer, and Murphy (2010); and Gerardi, Foote, and Willen (2010). 
2 Although readership of print newspapers has slipped over the past decade, internet news readership 
has steadily increased (Pew Research Center 2011). Many newspapers now have web presences that 
rival their print editions, so that total readership of newspapers has held steady or even risen.   4 
 
2005 that home-price increases largely reflected “strong economic fundamentals" (Greenspan 2002, 
Bernanke 2005). Thus, without a systematic examination of views economists shared with the public, it 
is difficult to establish whether they helped the public make sense of robust home-price gains -- or 
whether they contributed to problems of „irrational exuberance‟ in housing markets by actively 
discounting downside risks.  
To investigate this question, this paper compiles and analyzes data on views of economists reported in 
24 California newspapers between 2002 and 2007. The case of California is interesting because home 
prices rose at double-digit rates through much of the state between 1998 and 2005, prompting 
widespread and continuous discussion of whether price bubbles were forming; prices uniformly 
declined thereafter, albeit at different rates in different metropolitan areas (see Figure 1). Given 
strong interest in questions of why home prices were rising so rapidly, and whether or when such gains 
might stop, opinions of economists were frequently solicited and reported in the press. Thus, the 24 
newspapers in our sample contained 379 stories on the housing bubble, including 688 instances in which 
economists‟ views were reported. Having a large number of representations of economists‟ views 
enables us to develop a systematic picture of information and analysis related by the economics 
profession to the general public in what became one of the epicenters of the housing crisis. 
In a nutshell, the results show some good news and some bad news. On the good news side, a decent 
number of academic economists, largely in forecast or real-estate centers at California universities, 
cautioned clearly from early on that housing prices were diverging increasingly from levels suggested 
by fundamentals, indicating at least that people should expect rates of appreciation to fall and/or that 
price levels might stagnate or slump. But on the bad news side, there was also a loud chorus of voices –
- mostly chief economists from the real-estate industry -- who dismissed this perspective and instead 
framed prices as rationally reflecting the state‟s unique economic fundamentals. As will be argued 
here, the frequent and colorful views expressed by this group acted as „spoilers‟: even if their views 
were blatantly bullish, the fact that their analyses and forecasts seemed more in line with housing-
market developments in 2002-05 than those of other commentators clouded the picture supplied to the 
public of the economics profession‟s interpretation of what was happening in housing markets. This 
problem was exacerbated by the fact that, up until mid-2005, comments from top Federal Reserve 
officials seemed broadly supportive of this group‟s positions. After reviewing the evidence, the paper 
discusses issues of how to evaluate assessments and predictions which turn out to be „off‟ ex post but 
may have been reasonably formulated ex ante -- rooting discussion in concepts of „good faith‟ and 
„harm avoidance‟. As such, it aims to advance the emerging literature on appropriate ethics for the 
economics profession (DeMartino 2010, Epstein and Carrick-Hagenbarth 2010). 




Although it is often acknowledged that the media provide an important conduit via which economic 
information and analysis are transmitted from economists to the general public (e.g. Hamermesh 
2004), there has been little prior research on how this conduit works. Central issues about which little 
is known include: what types of economists offer information or analysis via the press (academic, 
policy, think-tank, business/financial); whether the press offers a broad distribution of economists‟ 
viewpoints or whether it gives special attention to certain types of views; and whether commentary 
comes primarily from economists experienced in dealing with the media, who value opportunities for 
publicity and know how to get their messages across, and/or from people who are contacted more 
randomly and have less skill in shaping how their views are presented. Harder to get a handle on but 
equally important are questions of the extent to which the general public pays attention to economic-
news coverage and/or whether they „decode‟ the information and analysis provided by economists in 
the same way that economists intend (Starr 2008). Beginning to fill in these voids is helpful for 
developing our understanding of the extent to which the public is well served by the economics 
profession, or whether there are practices that ought to be changed if economics is to have the social 
value that the profession intends (DeMartino 2010).  
Previous research on professional forecasting is valuable for thinking about whether economists‟ views 
shared with the public via the media best meet the general public‟s needs and interests.
3 A good share 
of economists‟ views quoted in the media comes from economists who speak regularly to the press (as 
will be demonstrated below for the present case). Economists‟ employers may benefit from having 
them maintain high public profiles, as is the case with economists at forecasting firms, in trade 
associations, and in research functions at banks, brokerages, and mutual funds. Their jobs may entail 
regular release of data on which they offer comments; for example, the chief economist of the 
National Association of Realtors regularly comments on its monthly release of data on existing home 
sales. Well-cited economists may hold interesting and contrarian views on widely-discussed issues, as 
was the case with Dean Baker and Robert Shiller in the years when the housing bubble was building. Or 
journalists may simply find them to be consistently helpful and effective in commenting on economic 
news (Mandel 2004).  
The literature on professional forecasting helps to lay out some of the incentives faced by people asked 
to share assessments and predictions in a public venue. It has long been noted that, when one looks at 
panel data on forecast errors of professional forecasters, there is some predictability to their errors. 
                                                           
3 Note that often economists interested in questions of relaying economic ideas via the media are most 
concerned with the influence on the economic policymaking process (e.g. Zimmermann 2004). Our 
concern here is instead with influence on the general public, which arguably is at least as important if 
households and businesses form their economic expectations and understandings in good part based on 
information they acquire from the media.  6 
 
This suggests they are not providing their actual „best‟ forecasts –- in which the mean square forecast 
error is minimized –- because if they were, they should detect and eliminate any systematic sources of 
„miss‟ in their predictions. Various studies have examined possible explanations for this pattern. 
Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) show that, if forecasters differ in their abilities, it can be rational for a 
forecaster to give a forecast which combines her own error-minimizing forecast with that of other 
forecasters known to be especially „able‟. Their analysis of data from the North-Holland Economic 
Forecast turns out to reject this hypothesis, as forecasts are biased in the directions of forecasters with 
big rather than small „misses‟. Still, this raises a possibility of potential importance in this paper: that 
the forecasts of people regarded as especially able (as Alan Greenspan was during this period) may 
affect those of less skilled or experienced people.  
Laster, Bennett and Geoum (1999) elaborate on implications of characteristics of users of economic 
forecasts for the incentives faced by forecasters. Specifically, they differentiate between „intensive‟ 
and „occasional‟ users of forecasts, where the former closely monitor forecasters‟ track records over 
time, while the latter consult forecasts only occasionally and opt to rely on forecasters who did best in 
the most recent period.
4 Because returns from attracting occasional users are good, forecasters will not 
supply their best forecasts but rather will focus on doing well at forecasting short-term trends. Their 
analysis of forecasts published in the Blue Chip Economic Indicators is broadly supportive of this model. 
This calls attention to problems that could arise during asset-price bubbles, if the general public pays 
special attention to the predictions of „bullish‟ forecasters because their recent forecast errors have 
been relatively low.    
A final study to mention is that of Ashiya (2009), who considers ways in which forecasters‟ incentives 
are shaped by their professional affiliations. He considers three possible mechanisms that might 
influence their forecasts: (1) a „wishful expectations hypothesis‟, wherein the forecaster predicts that 
variables will change in ways that would benefit the employer (e.g. that an economist working for a 
brokerage company would predict rising stock prices); (2) a „publicity hypothesis‟, wherein the 
forecaster aims to have her forecasts cited in the press; and (3) a „signaling hypothesis‟, wherein 
forecasters deliberately make predictions distant from the consensus to signal that they are „able‟ [and 
so have no tendencies to „herd‟, as per Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) and Pons-Novell (2003)]. His 
evidence on forecasts of GDP growth from Japanese economists finds good support for the „publicity 
hypothesis.‟ It is notable, however, that his ability to test the „wishful expectations hypothesis‟ is 
relatively limited, as it is based on the proposition that economists working for private for-profit 
businesses may have an upward bias in their growth predictions relative to economists working for 
                                                           
4 See also Carroll (2003), who considers a model in which consumers only infrequently update their 
expectations, making use of information supplied by professional forecasters. This imparts a 
„stickiness‟ to aggregate expectations, as a good part of the stock of prevailing expectations will be 
based on out-of-date information.  7 
 
research firms. In the present study, there is a stronger incentive to produce forecasts with „wishful 
expectations‟, in that economists associated with large institutions in the real-estate industry supplied 
an appreciable share of the assessments and predictions related to housing prices and sales that were 
relayed by economists to the public via the press, and thereby could hope to affect housing-market 
developments discernibly by conveying bullish forecasts.  
Data   
 
The data in this paper come from 24 California newspapers available in the Lexis Nexis database for the 
period between January 2002 and December 2007 period.
5 To identify potentially relevant stories, I 
searched for stories that included at least one of a set of terms related to home prices and sales 
("housing price", "home price", "house price", "housing sales", "home sales”, "house sales”), along with 
the terms „bubble‟ and „economist‟. As was often mentioned in articles on the „bubble‟, the term does 
not have a standard definition, so there is no assurance that people talking about whether there were 
bubbles in California property markets were talking about the same thing. To be clear, in the context 
of what was being discussed at the time, I take a good definition of the term „bubble‟ to be: a period 
of protracted divergence between the market price of an asset and the value implied by its 
fundamental determinants, during which the volume of trading or sales is also unusually high.
6 While 
individual economists may or may not have had this concept in mind when commenting on bubble-
related issues,
7 the term „bubble‟ provides a useful way to identify relevant articles as it was a central 
organizing trope in discussions about how to interpret unusual trends in home prices and sales in the 
state during this period. 
To winnow down the pool of articles to those which were on topic, I reviewed the set of articles 
returned by the search and dropped those which were not centrally concerned with housing-price 
bubbles in California or the U.S.
8 I also dropped stories that referred generically to views of 
„economists‟ without indicating who those economists were. As a matter of capturing distinct original 
news stories, I omitted duplicates or near-duplicates of stories appearing in the same newspaper (for 
example, due to early vs. final editions, corrections, or updates). However, if the same news event 
(e.g. congressional testimony by Alan Greenspan) was reported in different stories in multiple 
newspapers, each story was included as a separate entry in the data base; effectively this weights 
individual news stories according to how widely they were picked up by California newspapers. This 
                                                           
5 See the appendix for the list of included papers. Only general newspapers were included in the 
analysis, on the grounds that business newspapers are unlikely to be widely read by members of the 
general public. 
6 For discussion of definitions of bubbles, see Brunnermeier (2008). 
7 For example, some economists took „speculative‟ buying to be a defining characteristic of a bubble.  
8 Many of these were articles on the high-tech bubble of the late 1990s, from which California was just 
recovering at the outset of the period. 8 
 
methodology yielded a total of 379 bubble-related stories and 668 instances of economists being 
quoted by name over the six-year period.  
 
For the remaining stories, I went through and recorded the story‟s publication date, the newspaper(s) 
in which it appeared, the names and affiliations of any economists mentioned by name in the article, 
and the gist of what they said. I then read through the comments (with the name and affiliation of the 
economist concealed) and coded any views expressed by the economist on the following three issues: 
  Any prediction as to future home prices –- in particular, will they:  
o  continue to rise at an extraordinary pace 
o  return to a more healthy/normal/historical single-digit appreciation rate 
o  stop rising and either stay flat or modestly decline for some period 
o  possibly even decline absolutely 
  If the person gave no prediction of future home prices, but did comment on current prices and/or 
price gains to-date -- did they see these as:  
o  consistent with fundamental factors affecting California housing markets (e.g. little new 
home construction, scarcity of buildable land, strong income growth, population growth, 
low mortgage rates) 
o  unsustainable and/or out of line with fundamental determinants of housing prices 
  In cases where the person specifically addressed the question of whether there was a bubble in 
specific California markets and/or the state as a whole -- did they say:  
o  Yes, there is a bubble (in this area) 
o  No, there is not a bubble (in this area) 
o  I don‟t know 
In cases where the person‟s remarks were not related to the above points, they were left uncoded and 
were not analyzed. In only 31 of the 668 instances where economists were quoted were the comments 
not code-able via the above scheme.
9  
Tables 1 and 2 give some basic descriptive statistics on coverage of economists‟ views. As shown in 
Table 1, 153 economists were quoted on the subject of housing-price bubbles during these years, for an 
average of 4.4 times each. However, the distribution of quoted views across economists was highly 
skewed. The top 10% most-quoted economists provided more than half the quotes; the top four 
individuals, each quoted 25 times or more, accounted for more than a quarter of the total. At the 
                                                           
9 These cases cover a mishmash of topics, including general assessments of housing-market conditions 
(e.g. “It‟s a buyer‟s market”), projections for how changes in interest rates by the Federal Reserve 
would affect mortgage interest rates, discussions of wealth effects on local economies, and towards 
the end of the period, increasing concerns about mortgage delinquencies and defaults.  9 
 
other end of the spectrum, over half of all economists were quoted only once. This illustrates the 
potentially important influence that often-quoted economists could have on the public‟s expectations. 
 
Table 2 shows the institutional affiliations of the economists whose views were quoted. 42.4% of quotes 
came from academic or think-tank economists, with people in forecast or real-estate research centers 
at California universities contributing the lion‟s share; notably, the Anderson Forecast at UCLA alone 
provided 44% of quotes coming from this group. Next in relative importance were quotes from 
economists at the major trade associations in the real-estate industry –- especially the National 
Association of Realtors, California Association of Realtors, National Association of Home Builders, 
California Building Industry Association, and Mortgage Bankers Association –- along with top economists 
from Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae with whom they frequently appeared. Economists from private 
forecasting and consulting firms like Economy.com provided another 11.2% of quoted views; those from 
private financial institutions like Wells Fargo another 8.7%; and 6.4% came from Federal Reserve 
officials, especially Alan Greenspan.  
 
Results 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between appreciation in home prices in California over the 2002-07 
period and the number of economists quoted by name in California newspapers. In 2002-03, when home 
prices were rising by 13-14% annually, newspapers quoted economists‟ views 75-100 times each year. 
Home appreciation jumped to 25% in 2004 and slipped back only a bit to 21% in 2005, when the number 
of economists‟ views quoted rose to almost 250. In June 2005, Greenspan made a much-quoted remark 
about „froth‟ in certain markets in recent months, followed in July by a reference to „speculative 
fervor‟ in some regional markets. When California home sales markedly decelerated in late 2005, it was 
widely recognized that the over-heated conditions of recent years were ending. Appreciation dropped 
back to 3% in 2006 and turned negative in 2007. As uncertainty about the future direction of home 
prices receded, the number of economists‟ views on the subject of the bubble also dropped back.
10  
Table 3 shows how economists‟ views of housing prices evolved over the 2002-07 period. At the outset 
of the period, quoted views from economists were almost evenly balanced between giving predictions 
about future prices and offering assessments of whether price levels or gains were consistent with 
fundamental determinants of home prices. Interestingly, in 2002, 40.5% of predictions were for prices 
to level off or fall in coming years, repeating the pattern that set in after the housing boom which 
ended in the early 1990s (see Figure 1). But the following year, this share fell to 29.1%, in favor of 
predictions that appreciation would taper down into a normal, healthy, single-digit range. This 
                                                           
10 This reflects a combination of lower interest in economists‟ views, as the onset of depreciation 
resolved uncertainty about where home prices were heading, and the fact that the term „bubble‟ was 
increasingly replaced in discussions of prices by terms like „housing crash‟ and „housing slump‟.  10 
 
possibility of a „soft landing‟ -– exiting from an overheated phase into one of normal growth –- was the 
majority view through 2006, when prices clearly crested. In 2005, the last year of booming housing 
markets, only 17.8% of predictions called attention to the possibility that home prices could decline 
absolutely. Only in 2007, when prices were obviously declining, did the preponderance of predictions 
shift over to flat or falling prices.  
At the same time, after 2002, most quoted remarks that did not give a prediction, but did comment on 
the relationship between home prices and fundamental determinants of home prices, described home 
prices as too high relative to fundamentals and/or rising at an „unsustainable‟ rate; from 2004 on, this 
share was above 80%. In many instances, economists pointed to formal or informal methods of gauging 
what price levels „ought‟ to be based on rental costs, income levels, or income growth. Notably, 
UCLA‟s Edward Leamer tried hard to get across that “Your home has a P/E ratio too”, i.e. that in the 
long run its price should reflect the value of potential earnings from renting it out, net of maintenance 
and management costs. As early as 2002, his analysis showed substantial overvaluation in home prices, 
and although he would not predict how this overvaluation would be corrected going forward, he was 
clear that it posed real risks: "This is just an early alert saying you had better be worried about where 
this ship is going, because we are moving into dangerous waters."
11 
Table 4 shows data on statements made by economists directly on the question of whether housing-
price „bubbles‟ had emerged in one or more California housing markets. In 2002, over one-third of 
quoted views contained a statement about whether there was a bubble, but this share trailed down 
over time, possibly because people found the zero-one notion of „bubble‟ to be decreasingly useful as a 
way of representing risks present in the housing market. Nonetheless, among quoted views which did 
comment on the possibility of a bubble, the share agreeing that there was one rose from a low of 27% 
in 2003 to 57% in 2005, right before the market turned. This suggests that, in the last year of the 
housing boom, a member of the general public might reasonably have taken the economics profession 
to be split on the question of whether there was a bubble in the housing market.  
To gain more insight into who was conveying what views of housing-price developments and investigate 
possible sources of bias in the opinions economists offered, Table 5 breaks down economists‟ 
predictions and assessments according to the type of institution with which they were affiliated. What 
stands out is the unambiguously „bullish‟ views offered by economists from the major real-estate trade 
associations and mortgage giants Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae; for simplicity, this group is hereafter 
referred to as „real-estate industry economists‟. Whereas 49.8% of quotes from economists from other 
types of institutions contained some prediction about the future direction of housing prices, 63.7% of 
those from real-estate industry economists did, suggesting the latter aimed to convey certainty about 
where prices were going. In terms of what they predicted, 86.1% of comments of economists from the 
                                                           
11 From Leamer‟s report on “Bubble Trouble”, covered in the Sacramento Bee on June 25, 2002.  11 
 
real-estate industry predicted that strong home-price appreciation would continue or that it would 
taper down to a healthy, normal single-digit rate -- compared to 48.9% of other economists. Among 
quoted views giving an assessment of housing prices but not a prediction, quotes from real-estate 
industry economists were almost evenly split between comments that acknowledged some divergence 
from fundamentals and comments seeing them as well-aligned; quotes from other economists were 
split about 80/20 between a notable divergence and good consistency with fundamentals. In all cases, 
these differences between economists from the real-estate industry and other economists were 
statistically significant at a 5% level or better.  
 
Three other patterns in the data are worth noting. First, academic and think-tank economists as a 
group leaned „bearish‟ compared to economists overall: they were more likely to predict flat or falling 
prices, and raised more concerns about divergences between prevailing prices and fundamentals of 
home values. The opinions of economists from UCLA Anderson Forecast, especially its director Edward 
Leamer (quoted 32 times) and senior economist Christopher Thornberg (70 quotes), were strongly 
influential in this bearish tilt: because the two of them alone provided 36% of quoted views from 
academics, and 15.2% of all quotes from economists, their decidedly risk-conscious views significantly 
tilted the distribution of economists‟ opinions shared with the general public in a negative direction. 
Thus, for example, if comments from Leamer and Thornberg are excluded, the share of comments from 
academics expressing concerns about misalignment between prices and fundamental drops from 83.2% 
to 68.3%.  
 
Second, views expressed by economists from private forecasting and consulting firms and from private 
financial institutions were fairly similar to those of academics as a group, although economists from 
private financial institutions were more optimistic that appreciation rates would taper down to a 
normal single-digit range. Neither group was anywhere near as positive as economists from the real-
estate industry. Third, comments offered by Federal Reserve officials (mainly Alan Greenspan, but also 
Ben Bernanke and respective presidents of the San Francisco Fed, Robert Parry and Janet Yellen) were 
oddly dichotomous. When they offered predictions about future prices, which was relatively rare, they 
uniformly said they expected them to settle back into low-to-normal rates of appreciation.
12 But later 
along in the period, Greenspan began offering assessments of levels of home prices vis-à-vis their 
                                                           
12 Greenspan made statements to this effect in May 2002 and March 2003, which was admittedly before 
the outsized appreciation rates of 2003-04 occurred. In late 2005, after California home sales had 
dropped ominously, Yellen predicted, "We may have some cooling in California in some markets, but 
nothing terribly pervasive, nothing dramatic." Bernanke‟s congressional testimony in early 2006 
suggested that housing markets would slow down from their torrid pace, but said that "… at this point, 
a leveling out or modest softening of housing activity seems more likely than a sharp contraction.”  
 12 
 
fundamentals which were notably bearish. We return to a discussion of this late shift in Fed opinions 
below.  
Finally, Table 6 shows economists‟ statements about the possibility that there was a bubble in 
California housing prices according to the type of institution with which they were affiliated. Again, 
economists associated with the real-estate industry stand out as absolute outliers: 91% of their 
comments rejected that there were bubbles in California housing markets. Indeed many of their 
comments colorfully dismissed „bubble babble‟ in no uncertain terms. For example:  
"The time has come to put this issue to rest … The nation's home builders have said it, the 
Realtors have said it, and Alan Greenspan has said, in no uncertain terms: There is no such 
thing as a current or impending house-price bubble." 
--David Seiders, chief economist, National Association of Home Builders (Sept. 2002) 
"I feel we have driven a stake through the heart of the housing bubble story … There are 
fundamental reasons why home prices in general keep rising."  
--Robert Kleinhenz, deputy chief economist, California Association of Realtors (May 2003) 
"I don't hear a popping sound at all in 2004 … The next decade will be great for housing."  
--David Lereah, chief economist, National Association of Realtors (Nov. 2003) 
“Should you buy tomorrow? None of us knows if prices will fall tomorrow. Over the longer run, 
places like San Diego, where people want to live, will see more population, and prices will go up." 
--David Berson, chief economist, Fannie Mae (Jan. 2005) 
It was only after Greenspan‟s remarks about „froth‟ and „speculative fervor‟ in mid-2005 that 
economists in this group stopped making such remarks, although even then David Lereah of the 
National Association of Realtors attempted one last „spin‟:  
"Yes, there is froth in the markets, but you know froth can be healthy … It's not a bad word. 
And unfortunately the media, I think, has really been carried away with the word 'froth,' just 
like they were with 'irrational exuberance' in the stock markets. ... I could think of froth as 
effervescence rather than some popping of bubbles." (June 2005) 
In contrast, 64% of comments by academic economists agreed that there were bubbles in California 
housing markets, with shares of economists from private forecasting and consulting firms and private 
financial institutions not far behind (60% and 57% respectively). Opinions of Fed officials, while 
nowhere near as dismissive as those of economists from the real-estate industry, clearly tilted in the 
same direction, with over three-quarters of them rejecting the idea of notable problems with housing-
price bubbles.
13  
                                                           
13 True to form, Greenspan‟s language never completely ruled the possibility of bubbles. For example, 
in fielding questions after testifying before Congress in 2002, Greenspan said, "We've looked at the 13 
 
Before we proceed to discussion, it is valuable to pull together the various views of Fed officials 
reported in California newspapers over this period. Because there are only 43 of them, it is helpful to 
aggregate them into two categories: „bullish‟ comments which portrayed home prices as largely 
reflecting fundamentals, free of bubbles, and/or unlikely to flatten out or turn down in the years 
ahead; and „bearish‟ comments which portrayed them as out of line with fundamentals, containing 
bubbles to some degree, and/or likely to flatten out or turn down in years ahead. Figure 3 shows the 
results of this categorization. Clearly, opinions of Fed officials related to home prices were simply not 
reported much in the years when the bubble was building: they were mentioned three to seven times 
per year in 2002-04 and ran in a bullish direction. It was only in mid-2005, when Greenspan made his 
remarks about „froth‟ and „speculative fervor‟, that Fed views were widely covered in the California 
press. Low reporting of Fed opinions on the possibility of a housing-price bubble before 2005 mostly 
reflected the fact that top Fed officials commented infrequently on this possibility, rather than Fed 
officials commenting regularly but their views not receiving coverage in the press. Nothing about their 
comments „leaned against the wind‟ as the housing-price bubble was building, but they tried 
anemically to lean against the wind as it started deflating, as shown in the small stream of bullish 
comments given in 2006.  
Discussion 
In trying to evaluate how well economists served the public in the information and analysis they 
provided via the press in the years before the housing bubble burst, it is important to underline the 
uncertainties associated with forecasting, which are easy to underestimate ex post. Good forecasting 
requires a shrewd and thorough assessment of incoming data, in view of a solid understanding of the 
underlying processes that generate the data. Especially when it comes to forecasting markets in which 
psychological, behavioral or expectational phenomena may have caused prices to become detached 
from fundamentals, it can be difficult to detect in a timely way when a break has occurred. Thus, some 
say the only way to know for sure whether a given market has a bubble is „in the rear view‟. Moreover, 
even when incoming data suggest the odds are good that a bubble is in progress, it is very difficult to 
foresee how long the divergence will last, how much its magnitude may widen before it turns, and 
whether it will close in an orderly or disorderly way. Thus, for example, even the UCLA Anderson 
economists who spotted the divergence early on predicted it would end with a „fizzle‟ rather than a 
„pop‟ (that is, that price growth would turn minimal for a long stretch of time). While this seemed like 
a likely scenario, given what happened in California in the early 1990s when an earlier set of price 
bubbles deflated (see Fig. 1), the most-quoted UCLA economist, Christopher Thornberg, eventually 
                                                                                                                                                                                           




stated plainly that there was no solid basis for predicting how the bubble would end: “We're in 
uncharted waters, and you're asking me what island's up ahead, …. I don't have a clue.''
14 
Such uncertainties imply that forecasts that look off the mark ex post may have represented 
reasonably-formulated guesses ex ante. Then on what basis could we judge whether information 
provided by economists served the California public well in helping them interpret the unusual 
developments in housing markets over this period? There are two layers of considerations in thinking 
this through. The first concerns whether the predictions and assessments economists supplied to the 
public were supplied in good faith. The concept of good faith (bona fide) implies a sincere intention to 
deal fairly with others. It has a concrete meaning in legal settings, in general referring to “A party‟s 
state of mind in acting or carrying out an action or transaction, evincing honesty, fairness, full 
communication of any hidden issues or information, and an absence of intent to harm other individuals 
or parties to the transaction” (Webster’s New World Law Dictionary, 2010). The notion of „good faith‟ 
figures into standards of conduct in a variety of legal, professional, business, and employment settings, 
conveying the expectation that people will carry out the obligations of their positions with good effort 
and attention to those obligations, and without malice, negligence, or intention to deceive. Thus, a 
person acting in good faith who makes decisions that turn out to have negative consequences for others 
(provided that she has upheld all other duties implied by her position) should not be held liable for 
those consequences, as there is nothing she could reasonably have been expected to do to prevent 
them. I would argue that this concept provides a good way of thinking about one set of problems that 
arose in the transmission of information and analysis from economists to the public via the press during 
the housing-price bubble.  
 
In particular, it is clear that the strongly bullish perspectives offered by economists from the real-
estate industry were not delivered in good faith, but rather reflected some effort to skew the public‟s 
expectations in directions of benefit to their employers. As shown above, they portrayed soaring home 
prices as well aligned with fundamentals, dismissed talk of bubbles, and/or insisted that double-digit 
price appreciation would just settle down into a normal, healthy range, above the rate of inflation. To 
illustrate that their comments were of sufficient clarity and volume to influence the distribution of 
opinions from economists presented to the general public, Figure 4 shows shares of quoted views that 
could be categorized as „bullish‟ using the method described above, including and excluding views 
offered by economists from the real-estate industry. Quotes from economists from the real-estate 
industry notched up the prevalence of bullish views by 5 to 13 percentage points over the period. 
Especially in 2005, when it became increasingly clear that the housing boom was ending and financial 
fragilities were building, the share of bullish comments offered by other economists dropped from 36% 
to 29%, but the optimistic calls of economists from the real-estate industry kept the overall share 
                                                           
14 Reported in the Orange County Register, 10/12/2004. 15 
 
steady at 43%. The size and direction of these biases underline that they reflected concerted efforts to 
influence public opinion with respect to the housing market. 
 
Does this upward bias simply reflect „self-selection‟ of people with positive outlooks for housing into 
the real-estate industry, with minimal issues of forecasts and analyses not made in good faith? To be 
sure, some degree of self-selection seems likely, on the grounds that it would be difficult to work for 
employers with strong „wishful expectations‟ without being bullish oneself. But it is not plausible that 
the expressed outlooks of these economists can be attributed to self-selection alone. For one, unlike 
the forecasts and analyses of other economists, those of economists from the real-estate industry 
conveyed consistently high degrees of certainty about the housing-market outlook; given that all 
forecasts and analyses are subject to uncertainty, consistently implying that one‟s own are not is 
problematic and misleading (see below for further discussion).
15 For another, their employers were 
clearly engaged in projects to sustain positive attitudes towards home-buying, whether or not market 
conditions warranted them. Especially striking was that, in early 2008 when prices were depreciating at 
double-digit rates, the NAR spent $40 million on an advertising campaign to promote home-buying, 
emphasizing that “a home isn't just a great place to raise a family; it's also the key to building long-
term wealth"; even Gary Becker of the University of Chicago cautioned that the NAR‟s material never 
mentioned that real estate is a “risky investment [so that] unless borrowers recognize that, they could 
be misled" (Cuneo 2008: 1).
16  
It is legitimate to ask whether the general public would have discounted the views of economists from 
the real-estate industry, given that their affiliations are always clearly stated next to their names, and 
it could be obvious that they and their employers would benefit from stoking and prolonging strong 
housing-market conditions.
17 In fact, newspaper stories occasionally referred to people from this group 
-- notably Leslie Appleton-Young, the chief economist of the California Association of Realtors (CAR), 
who is one of the top 4 most cited economists in the sample -- as „cheerleaders‟ or „boosters‟ of the 
housing industry, so careful readers could well have taken note.
18 But there are two reasons to be 
concerned that the public would not have discounted their opinions by as much as they should have. 
                                                           
15 See e.g. Clements and Hendry (1998) or Ericsson (2001) on forecast uncertainty. Gross (2007) and 
Keates (2009) discuss controversy over whether Lereah‟s unrelentingly bullish forecasts were deceitful, 
irresponsible, incompetent, and/or some combination thereof. In contrast, many of the bearish 
forecasters during this period freely acknowledged that, even if they were confident that home prices 
had diverged significantly from underlying values, they could not foresee when and how these 
divergences might start to reverse. 
16 Keates (2009) discusses comments made by Lereah suggesting that his NAR career benefited during 
the bubble years from “doing everything they wanted me to”, and that the NAR‟s public-relations 
department sometimes wrote in even more optimism that his own outlooks conveyed. He was 
apparently nudged out of the chief economist position in 2007, at least partly due to how discredited 
he was after the housing market turned (Leonard 2008). 
17 In this sense, the problem here differs from that analyzed in Epstein and Carrick-Hagenbarth (2010), 
who examine issues of undisclosed financial conflicts of interest. 
18 See also Gross (2007). 16 
 
First is the issue of infrequent sampling of economists‟ opinions: If most people were not regularly 
reading newspaper stories that relayed perspectives from economists, they may not have detected and 
„factored out‟ the systematic bias in the positions of economists from the real-estate industry. Second 
is the problem that, if infrequent consumers of forecasts use recent forecast „misses‟ as the basis for 
choosing whose forecasts to believe, people who were forecasting high rates of home price 
appreciation during this period would have the best-looking track records of the bunch. Thus, articles 
sometimes noted that the forecasts of economists from the real-estate industry had been better than 
those of others in recent years, even if they seemed “wildly optimistic” (e.g. Fresno Bee 3/18/2005), 
while those from places like UCLA Anderson Forecast were chronically undershooting.  
 
But even if reasons for bias of economists from the real-estate industry were fairly transparent, their 
predictions and assessments clearly acted as spoilers in debates about housing bubbles. For one, even 
if people recognized that their positions were self-interested, their continuous efforts to promote the 
„availability‟ of their position (in the sense of Kahneman and Tversky (1974)) made sure that the public 
viewed it as a possible scenario, even if not the most likely one. Their efforts in this respect benefited 
considerably from Greenspan‟s sparse comments in 2002-05, which seemed quite supportive of their 
positions (a point to which we return below). In addition, their continuous promotion of a strongly 
bullish view made sure the public viewed economists as having no consensus on the question of what 
was going on with housing prices; as one article put it, “The consensus among economists is: There is 
no consensus on the likely future course for the housing market” (Inland Valley Daily Bulletin, 
11/10/2006). From the point of view of average members of the general public, this would have 
conveyed that what was happening in the housing market was simply uncertain, so it was up to them to 
discern what the most likely scenario was.  
This brings us to the second layer of problems in evaluating whether economists failed the California 
public in the information and analysis they conveyed via the press. If we omit the views of economists 
from the real-estate industry, do the comments of the rest look like they were conveying to the public 
a helpful representation of what was going on in the housing market –- that is, one which would have 
enabled average people thinking about buying, selling, or refinancing a home to make a decently-
informed decision? With the benefit of hindsight, their failure to grasp the risks of prices declining 
absolutely looks like a huge mistake; for example, in 2004 only 32% of predictions about prices 
(excluding those of economists from the real-estate industry) indicated they could actually drop. For 
the most part, economists based their predictions on what had happened after the earlier price 
bubbles that had deflated in the 1990s: prices slipped for several years after markets peaked but 17 
 
mostly people just held their properties off the market, waiting for demand to pick back up.
19 What 
was different this time, as we now know, is how highly leveraged people‟s home purchases were, and 
how many people who bought homes had taken out variable-payment mortgages, so that financial 
fragility in households‟ balance sheets steadily built as the bubble continued (Mian and Sufi 2009). 
Thus, to the extent that economists made a systematic error in interpreting the incoming data on 
housing-market conditions, it was a failure to fully appreciate that these „emergent properties‟ of 
mortgage markets meant significant changes in historical relationships between home prices and sales. 
This supports the position of Colander et al. (2009) and others that modeling methods in which 
structural relationships are allowed to change over time in potentially complex ways could be of 
considerable benefit for detecting emerging risks.  
 
But even if a good part of the assessments and predictions supplied by economists to the public were 
„off‟ for understandable reasons, especially among top economists one can point to notable instances 
of inattention to a burden of harm avoidance to which the profession ought to be mindful when sharing 
opinions with the public. In many fields like law and medicine, in which professionals with specialized 
knowledge give advice, guidance or treatment to others who lack that knowledge, a basic standard of 
conduct is that the professional‟s actions and behaviors will „do no harm‟ to those who consult them; 
that is, they should not be made any worse off than they would have been had they not consulted the 
professional to begin with [see DeMartino (2010: 124-130) for detailed discussion]. Economists who 
share their opinions via the media typically do not view themselves as providing a service to the public, 
as there is no semblance of a buyer/seller or professional/client relationship between them. But they 
do typically regard their media commentaries as helping the public understand economic phenomena 
more effectively than they could on their own, which is held to be important not for its own sake, but 
because it could have practical value in people‟s lives, for example, by helping them make better 
sense of changing economic conditions, make better choices as voters, etc.
20 In this sense, when 
economists agree to share their views with the public via the press, they agree to take on a role similar 
to that of a lawyer or doctor, wherein there is a fundamental asymmetry in knowledge between them 
and the people to whom they relate their views, and there is a burden upon them to make sure the 
knowledge they transmit does not have unintended negative consequences for others. This implies a 
                                                           
19 See, e.g. comments from UCLA‟s Ryan Ratcliff in the Contra Costa Times (6/22/2006). Other factors 
people cited to support their forecast of flat but not falling prices included lack of overbuilding and the 
underlying issue of scarce land putting a „floor‟ under how low prices could go. 
20 Thus, for example, Hamermesh (2004: 370) writes that, “Explaining economics through the media 
allows economists to reach far more people than they can in even the largest classes. If handled 
properly, the media provide academic economists with the chance to invest their time to enhance the 
national and global stock of knowledge about economic issues and behavior”. Similarly, Zimmermann 
(2004: 395) believes that “In the information age, an exchange with the media is part of the duties the 
economics profession has to educate the public.”  18 
 
need to be mindful that their dealings with the public at the very least do not make members of the 
public any worse off than they would have been, had they not read or listened to their views.  
 
In the context of the case at hand, this implied a burden on economists communicating their 
predictions and assessments related to the housing market to the California public to avoid 
inadvertently reducing their perceptions of possible downside risks, in the process causing them to 
hedge too little against them. Many economists articulated the view that a „soft landing‟ was the most 
likely end to the state‟s housing bubbles: outsized appreciation would be replaced by low to no 
appreciation for some years, but prices would not actually drop. Yet saying that something is the „most 
likely‟ scenario begs the question of what one thinks that likelihood is: it could be 100%, or 51%, or 
somewhere in between. If the subjective probability one has in mind for a soft landing is 75%, and the 
other 25% reflects the possibility of a very hard landing, an unqualified statement about a soft landing 
being more likely may give someone thinking about buying, selling or refinancing a home false 
confidence that its price will not go down. Many economists quoted in the California press were quite 
careful about making sure their assessments of downside risks came across clearly, even if they thought 
odds were better than not that prices would not plummet when the market slowed. For example, 
Kenneth Rosen of the University of California at Berkeley was quoted as expecting a “slow slump in 
prices, not double digit declines”, but he cautioned that "If enough people overextend themselves and 
lose their jobs, the bubble could pop" (Monterey County Herald, 5/26/2002). Similarly, Sun Won Sohn 
of Wells Fargo told the Contra Costa Times (7/1/2004) that “„My hope is that home prices will go up, 
but at a slower rate, letting jobs and income catch up.‟ But a doomsday endgame could emerge if job 
growth and income don‟t accelerate in the Bay area, he warned.” Keitaro Masuda of Union Bank 
conveyed that “A lot of people say there is no housing bubble, and I sort of share that view. But 
[we‟re not going to see] double-digit price increases going forward … it will not be something people 
can count on for their retirement or whatever” (San Diego Union-Tribute, 9/5/2004).
21 
 
At the other end of the spectrum were the comments of Alan Greenspan, which were given enormous 
weight due to his reputation as a masterful forecaster. As mentioned, up until 2005 his comments were 
decidedly negative towards the possibility that bubbles were forming in the nation‟s housing markets to 
any notable degree. His comments in 2002-03 argued that broad-based bubbles in housing markets 
were implausible a priori for a number of reasons, including: high transactions costs of buying and 
selling homes, which would keep speculation limited; the local or metropolitan character of housing 
markets, which make it hard for bubbles to become national in scope; and slowly evolving fundamental 
                                                           
21 Note that these sorts of qualified forecasts are broadly consistent with the recommendation of 
Engelberg, Manski and Williams (2006) that forecasts be given not as simple point forecasts, but in 
richer forms. While Engelberg et al. favor quantitative reporting of distributions of subjective 
expectations, as the above quotes indicate, people in the forecasting community often do this 
qualitatively in their natural-language choice. 19 
 
factors underlying demand for living space (productivity growth, household formation, immigration), 
which should impart a well-behaved, gradually rising trajectory to housing prices (Greenspan 2002, 
2003). True to form, Greenspan usually acknowledged that odds of seeing housing bubbles were not 
strictly zero, but he implied they were just a whisker above that; for example, "We've looked at the 
bubble question, and we've concluded that it is most unlikely".
22 It was not until 2005 that he began 
expressing concerns about downside risks, and some months after, California home prices topped out.  
Of course, Greenspan was not just any economist sharing his views with the public via the media, as his 
always-carefully-chosen words were widely regarded as containing valuable information on the likely 
future course of monetary policy. Moreover, as the top economic policymaker, the burdens he faced 
with respect to harm avoidance were far more substantial and complex than those of the other 
economists whose assessments and predictions we are evaluating. Nonetheless, three important points 
should be made concerning his comments about housing bubbles that appeared in the popular press. 
First, his sparse and bullish comments as the bubble was inflating suggested he saw no grounds for 
concern about where prices were going and that he had no intention of making any adjustments to 
monetary, financial or banking policies that might lean against the bubble. Thus, to the extent that 
people who were considering buying, selling or refinancing a home in 2002-05 might have given 
Greenspan‟s views some special credibility, what they would have gotten from him is “All is well”: 
prices are being driven by fundamentals, including income growth and scarcity of buildable land, 
implying no reason to think appreciation would top out or reverse. Thus, not only was his failure to 
adjust policies problematic in terms of making sure his decisions inflicted no harm on the public; his 
minimal and bullish comments on home prices suggested that people did not need to worry about 
downside risks. This does not meet the standard for harm avoidance, as listening to Greenspan‟s views 
likely diminished people‟s efforts to keep their household finances hedged against possibilities that 
home prices could fall.  
 
Second is the issue that Greenspan‟s views gave the bullish positions of the real-estate industry an 
authority that they would not have had on their own. As the comment from David Seiders of the 
National Home Builders Association quoted above indicated, the real-estate economists found it very 
helpful to point out that Greenspan disagreed that there were bubbles in the housing market, and 
instead thought that "low mortgage rates, immigration, and shortages of buildable land" explained the 
“sizable gains” in home prices.
23 
 
Finally, the sudden shift of opinion in 2005 was strangely out of line with Greenspan‟s usual careful and 
deliberate efforts to manage expectations, in a way that notched the probability of a soft landing way 
                                                           
22 From Q&A following congressional testimony, quoted in the Contra Costa Times (9/29/2002). 
23 San Diego Union-Tribune (8/10/2003) and Contra Costa Times (9/29/2002). 20 
 
down. In issues of making adjustments to interest rates, in view of incoming data relevant to gauging 
risks of inflation or unemployment, Greenspan was always careful to send advance warnings of changes 
in course before beginning to implement them, so that businesses, banks, financial markets, and 
consumers could begin to adjust their activities accordingly.
24 Of course, Greenspan did not believe 
(and continues to disbelieve) that central banks should be in the business of trying to manage asset 
prices (Greenspan 2004, 2010), so he presumably did not perceive himself to preparing for a change in 
policy course. He also doubted that “jawboning” by the central bank is capable of affecting asset 
prices unless it is accompanied by action (Greenspan 2004: 36). This may have led him to 
underestimate what effects his „froth‟ and „speculative fervor‟ remarks would have in suddenly shifting 
the subjective probabilities people attached to the soft vs. hard landing scenarios from the former to 
the latter. As it stood, his remarks seemed to boost the odds that the bubbles in California housing 
markets would end in a disorderly way: home sales dropped off much more quickly than people were 
expecting in the second half of 2005, so that by January 2006, even former staunch bulls like David 
Berson of Fannie Mae were acknowledging that, "At some point in the future, California probably will 
have another big housing recession …” (San Diego Union-Tribune, 1/6/2006). At the very least, 
beginning to share concerns about signs of overvaluation in home prices earlier on in the 2003-05 
period, before they were quite obvious, could have been quite beneficial for keeping housing bubbles 
from inflating to the extent that they did. More conscientious attention to the need to avoid harming 
others –- especially average members of the general public ill-prepared to deal with consequences of a 
bursting housing price bubble -- would have helped to flag to this fact.
25  
  
Summary and conclusion 
In sum, the preponderance of comments on housing prices given by economists via the press can be 
seen as having served the public reasonably well: many underlined that home prices were diverging 
increasingly from fundamental values, and that unusual appreciation was likely to end; even if few 
economists appreciated how severely home prices could decline, the extra risks due to increased 
leverage were not necessarily easy to foresee.  
At the same time, the study demonstrates the potential for the absence of ethical guidelines or 
standards of conduct within the economics profession to undercut both the reputation of the profession 
and its ability to contribute to social welfare. The results raise real concerns about whether some 
economists in the real-estate industry promoted unduly positive outlooks for home prices, stoking the 
bubble and raising odds that it would unwind in a disorderly way. Many scholarly and professional 
associations have some set of principles spelling out expectations of good professional conduct which  
would have flagged as problematic both the systematic tilt in the analyses of real-estate industry 
                                                           
24 See Chirinko and Curran (2010) for evidence and discussion.  
25 See Bansak and Starr (2011) on the issue of who pays the price when housing bubbles burst.  21 
 
economists towards the „wishful expectations‟ of their employers, and their inattention to possible 
aggregate consequences of their public comments.
26 Critical here is the asymmetric-information 
character of professional knowledge; if the public lacks a basis for differentiating between high-quality 
economic analysis done in good faith, and analyses intended to advance the interests of those who 
produce and circulate them, the public‟s trust in and willingness to rely on the profession for analysis 
and advice declines, to the detriment of both members of the profession and the public at large.
27 The 
present study illustrates that the reasonably formulated forecasts and analyses offered by many 
economists quoted in the press may not have had the beneficial effects that they could have had -- at 
best by leaning against the growth of the bubble as it was forming, or at least by encouraging more 
households to hedge their finances against its downside risks -- because they were mixed in with the 
unduly bullish comments of economists from the real-estate industry. This underlines that the potential 
of the economics profession to contribute to social welfare is likely to be enhanced by establishing 
norms of professional conduct that establish the priority of concerns with social welfare over those of 
personal gain, and that emphasize the importance of accuracy, freedom from bias, absence of 
intention to deceive, and attention to the wellbeing of others as fundamental, expected characteristics 
of economists‟ work.
28 
   
                                                           
26 To take a few examples, the Code of Professional Ethics of the 370,000-member American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants (2010) spells out that commitment to “the public trust should not be 
subordinated to personal gain and advantage. Integrity can accommodate the inadvertent error and the 
honest difference of opinion; it cannot accommodate deceit or subordination of principle” (Section 54, 
Article III). The American Chemical Society (2011) lays out that “Chemical professionals have a 
responsibility to serve the public interest … Public comments on scientific matters should be made with 
care and accuracy, without unsubstantiated, exaggerated, or premature statements.” The American 
Sociological Association (2011) states that sociologists “do not knowingly make statements that are 
false, misleading, or deceptive. … Sociologists value the public trust in sociology and are concerned 
about their ethical behavior and that of other sociologists that might compromise that trust. … They 
apply and make public their knowledge in order to contribute to the public good.” 
27 Law and Kim (2004) argue that solving the asymmetric information problem was a main rationale for 
adoption of professional standards and/or licensure in many professions in the late 19
th and early 20
th 
centuries. Contrary to the traditional economic interpretation of licensing as a means of restricting 
entry and boosting earnings, they find that entry often increased after licensing requirements were 
adopted, and some measures of service quality rose. Thus, licensing seemed to reduce Akerlof-style 
„lemons‟ problems, wherein inability to differentiate between “charlatans, incompetents, and frauds” 
and well-trained conscientious professions had limited market growth.   
28 See DeMartino (2010) for detailed discussion. While full discussion is beyond the scope of the present 
paper, it is worth noting that the explosion of economic research on social norms in recent years (e.g. 
Fehr and Fischbacher 2004) suggests that ethical codes may still have value even in the absence of 
mechanisms for imposing negative sanctions: if behavior is often governed by intrinsic motivations and 
social norms, not only extrinsic motivations and explicit incentive systems, clarifying that given 
behaviors are ethically unacceptable may reduce their incidence, especially if they are visible 
behaviors like commenting in the press. For discussion, see Noreen (1988) and Wendel (2001).  22 
 
 
Figure 1. Indexes of California home prices, by metropolitan area (1995=100) 
   
   
   
   
Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency, all-transactions repeat sales indexes, not adjusted for inflation. 
 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2. Trends in home prices and articles quoting economists in the California press 
Percent change in California home prices (year 
over year) 
Number of economists quoted by name in 
California newspapers 
   
Home price data from the Federal Housing Finance Agency.  
 
Figure 3. Number of „bullish‟ and „bearish‟ comments by top Federal Reserve 
officials quoted in the California press 
 
 
„Bearish‟ comments said one or more of the following: prices could drop or go 
flat for a protracted period; prices or price gains are out of line with 
fundamentals or unsustainable; there is a bubble in housing markets 
„Bullish‟ comments said one or more of the following: price gains will taper down 
to a normal, healthy single-digit level; strong price gains will continue; prices or 

































Figure 4. Share of quoted views from economists that were ‘bullish’, with and without economists from 
the real-estate industry 
 
Note: „Bullish‟ comments said one or more of the following: price gains will taper down to a normal, 
healthy single-digit level; strong price gains will continue; prices or price gains are in line with 
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Table 1. Distribution of economists and quotes, by number of times the 
economist was quoted, 2002-07 
  Economists  Quotes 
  #   %  #  % 
Totals  153  100  668  100 
By number of times economist was 
quoted, 2002-07:         
25+  4  2.6  177  26.5 
10-24  12  7.8  173  25.9 
5-9  20  13.1  131  19.6 
2-4  37  24.2  107  16.0 





Table 2. Affiliations of economists quoted  
Institution type 
Quotes 
Institutions with 10+ quotes 
Number   % of  
Academic & think tanks  283  42.4 
UCLA Anderson Forecast (125), UC-Berkeley (26), 
Chapman University (13), UC-Santa Barbara Economic 
Forecast Project (13) 
Real-estate trade 
associations, Freddie Mac, 
Fannie Mae 
146  21.9 
California Association of Realtors (56), National 
Association of Realtors (27), National Association of 
Home Builders (12), Mortgage Bankers Association 
(16), California Building Industry Association (11), 
Freddie Mac (11), Fannie Mae (11) 
Private forecasting & 
consulting firms  75  11.2  Economy.com (16) 
Private financial 
institutions  58  8.7  Wells Fargo (14) 
Federal Reserve System  43  6.4  Federal Reserve Board/Alan Greenspan (31) 
Other government agencies   15  2.2  (none) 
Other business associations  25  3.7  Los Angeles County Economic Development Corp. 
(18) 
Independent & 
miscellaneous  23  3.4  (none) 
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Prices are out 











2002  40.0  19.1  21.4  45.2  14.3  46.7  49.0  51.0 
2003  41.3  22.6  6.5  54.8  16.1  42.7  65.6  34.4 
2004  44.9  29.2  8.3  54.2  8.3  46.7  82.0  18.0 
2005  48.0  17.8  14.4  56.8  11.0  48.8  81.7  18.3 
2006  87.3  16.9  30.3  51.7  1.1  8.8  88.9  11.1 




Table 4. Statements on the possibility of a bubble in housing prices 




reflected a bubble 
Distribution of statements (%) 
N  Yes, there is 
a bubble 
No, there is 
no bubble 
I don't know 
whether there 
is a bubble 
2002  35.2  29.7  62.2  8.1  37 
2003  34.7  26.9  65.4  7.7  26 
2004  25.2  40.7  55.6  3.7  27 
2005  20.7  56.9  41.2  2.0  51 
2006  22.6  69.6  26.1  4.4  23 
2007  9.1  33.3  66.7  0.0  3 
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but without a 
prediction 





























All economists  52.8  20.1  21.3  50.4  8.2  38.9  73.9  26.2 
By affiliation:                 
Academic & think tank  48.4  30.8  29.5  34.9  4.8  39.9  83.2  16.8 
Real-estate trade 
associations, Freddie 
Mac, Fannie Mae 
63.7  5.4  8.6  71.0  15.1  28.1  48.8  51.2 
Private forecasting & 
consulting firms  54.7  34.2  31.7  34.2  0.0  38.7  79.3  20.7 
Private financial 
institutions  50.0  20.7  24.1  44.8  10.3  44.8  84.6  15.4 
Federal Reserve System  27.9  0.0  0.0  100.0  0.0  55.8  87.5  12.5 
Other   50.8  3.1  12.5  68.8  15.6  42.9  44.4  55.6 
           
     
All economists, excluding 
those at RE trade 
associations/Fred/Fan 
49.8  25.4  25.8  43.1  5.8  42.0  78.5  21.5 
Diff between RE trade 
associations/Fred/Fan & 
all others 
13.9*  -20.0*  -17.2*  27.9*  9.3*  -13.9*  -29.8*  29.8* 
p-value for difference=0  0.0030  0.0000  0.0005  0.0000  0.0051  0.0030  0.000  0.0000 
                 
Academic & think tank 
economists, excluding 
Edward Leamer and 
Christopher Thornberg  
56.8  28.4  22.0  43.1  6.4  31.3  68.3  31.7 
All economists from 
UCLA Anderson Forecast  43.2  33.3  46.3  18.5  1.9  52.0  100.0  0.0 28 
 
 
Table 6. Statements on the possibility of a bubble in housing prices 







Distribution of statements (%) 
N  Yes, there is 
a bubble  
No, there is 
no bubble  
I don't know 
whether 
there is a 
bubble 
All economists  25.0  44.9  50.3  4.8  90 
By affiliation:           
Academic & think tanks  31.8  64.4  31.1  4.4  90 
Real-estate trade 
associations, Freddie 
Mac, Fannie Mae 
22.6  6.1  90.9  3.0 
33 
Private forecasting & 
consulting firms 
13.3  60.0  40.0  0.0 
10 
Private financial 
institutions  12.1  57.1  42.9  0.0 
7 
Federal Reserve  30.2  23.1  76.9  0.0  13 
Other  22.2  14.3  64.3  21.4  14 
           
Difference between real-
estate trade associa-
tions/Fred/Fan & all 
others 
-3.1  -48.4*  47.6*  2.2 
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Appendix. List of 24 California newspapers included in the sample 
1.  Alameda Times-Star (Alameda, CA)  
2.  The Argus (Fremont, CA)  
3.  Contra Costa Times  
4.  The Daily Review (Hayward, CA)  
5.  Eureka Times-Standard (California)  
6.  The Fresno Bee  
7.  Inland Valley Daily Bulletin (Ontario, CA)  
8.  Long Beach Press-Telegram (Long Beach, CA)  
9.  Los Angeles Times  
10. The Merced Sun-Star (California)  
11. Modesto Bee  
12. Monterey County Herald (CA)  
13. The Oakland Tribune (Oakland, CA)  
14. The Orange County Register  
15. Pasadena Star-News (Pasadena, CA)  
16. Sacramento Bee  
17. San Bernardino Sun (San Bernardino, CA)  
18. San Diego Union-Tribune  
19. San Francisco Chronicle 
20. San Jose Mercury News (California)  
21. The San Luis Obispo Tribune  
22. San Mateo County Times (San Mateo, CA)  
23. Tri-Valley Herald (Pleasanton, CA)  
24. Vallejo Times-Herald (California)  